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INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION 
POLICY IN TRANSITION AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE LESSONS FROM LATIN 
AMERICA∗ 
IGNACIO DE LEÓN∗∗ 
This Article explores how institutions in developing countries shape 
competition policy-making and regulatory reform, the implications of this 
process on the adoption of a pro-market strategy to promote development, 
and the implications of its application to a country transitioning from a 
command economy to a market economy such as China. 
Institutional analysis is important for two reasons. First, it enables us to 
highlight the decisive role of social arrangements in shaping the way a 
policy aimed at changing institutional structures, like competition policy, 
is understood and enforced. This is important because institutional change 
creates unexpected challenges as market forces increasingly replace 
central planning as the driving force in allocating social resources. If not 
properly addressed, such challenges could frustrate the whole transition 
process. 
Second, exploring the role of institutions the development of 
competition policy raises important and controversial issues of law and 
economics, which scholars have not yet settled. In particular, institutional 
analysis overcomes some of the limitations of conventional economic and 
legal theory, which, due to its excessive emphasis on logical positivism, 
has blinded policy-makers to the fundamental role of institutions’ values 
and beliefs in enforcing social rules, thereby precluding a richer appraisal 
of social reality. 
Scholars usually agree institutions are defined by ideas, routines, and 
beliefs.1 But in order to assess their impact, we must examine the impact 
of these values and beliefs on the conduct of those involved in executing 
the policy. For example, we know that stronger institutions improve 
economic performance, but what does that imply? How do institutions 
 
 
 ∗ Presentation delivered before the Conference on Competition Policy and Economic 
Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing on September 17-20, 2002. 
 ∗∗ Ph.D. (Lon), M.Phil. (Lon.), LL.M. (Lon), LL.B. (Caracas). Professor of Law and Political 
Economy, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Caracas; former chief of Venezuela’s Competition 
Authority, Pro-Competencia. 
 1. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p405 De Leon book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
406 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:405 
 
 
 
 
impact individuals’ actions? How do we build stronger institutions in 
developing countries to enforce competition policy? 
To understand the impact of social institutions on competition policy 
enforcement, this Article suggests that competition policy enforcement is 
influenced by a combination of institutional factors that create positive 
incentives to encourage specific policy outcomes. The institutional factors 
influencing competition policymaking can be organized at three levels:  
1. the organizational level which refers to the structure of the 
decision-making process, creates external constraints on 
policymaking that influence the expediency of policy decisions; 
2. the ideological level which includes the personal beliefs of the 
policymakers, determines the policy priorities and normative 
choices of the decision-maker towards business arrangements; and 
3. the cultural, social level which refers to the set of social values 
within which the competition authority applies the policy, 
determines the long-run sustainability and legitimacy of the policy. 
This Article will examine the extent of each level’s influence and 
propose some guidelines for policy enforcement for the institutional 
constraints prevailing in a transition economy such as China’s. 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION AGENCIES AND ITS 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICYMAKING 
Institutional analysis first examines the structure of the social 
organization that determines given political outcomes. It explores the 
impact of organizational arrangements that are set up by legal rules and 
impact the incentives of those involved in the policy enforcement “game.” 
In other words, we examine the effect of legal rules on the conduct of the 
decision-maker, lawyers, expert witnesses, prosecuted firms, businesses in 
related sectors of the economy, and judges. In this analysis, policy 
enforcement is the outcome of a game the rules of which are determined 
by the given set of organizational arrangements embodied in the 
competition law of the jurisdiction concerned.2 
Research from several economic schools has contributed to the 
development of this perspective of institutional analysis, which some refer 
to as the “New Political Economy.” For example, Public Choice theory 
 
 
 2. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKLEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/12
p405 De Leon book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 407 
 
 
 
 
has emphasized the allocation problems that emerge in political markets 
whenever policies are made.3 Neo-Institutional Economics theory focuses 
on the impact of institutions on individual incentives and the resulting 
effect on economic performance.4 Additionally, Law and Economics 
theory argues that the legal system is simply a system of economic 
maximization, and that laws must be examined using economic principles 
and price theory. 5 Finally, the Economics of Regulation theory explains 
how private businesses might have incentives to capture regulatory 
authorities.6  
The unification of these theories provides a new perspective of the law, 
beyond formal interpretation of the mere wording of legal rules. In 
competition policy, these theories challenge the conventional idea that 
policies will achieve their goals and objectives if well-intentioned 
officials, guided by the pursuit of the public good, implement them. The 
New Political Economy gives us a less optimistic (or perhaps more 
balanced) view, suggesting that achieving the goals and objectives of a 
given policy depends entirely on the incentives of those implementing the 
policy. 
Based on the analytical tools of the New Political Economy, scholars 
suggest that the effectiveness of competition policy ultimately rests on 
both the internal organization of the competition authority and the external 
control exercised over the enforcing agency, most notably, by the judiciary 
and the government itself. These factors will impact the authority’s power 
to impose fines, declare injunctions, request information from the business 
sector, remain isolated from undue influence by political forces in the 
government and the business community, and exercise prosecutorial 
powers. 
Thus, the effectiveness of competition authorities initially lies in the 
agency’s internal organization and its power to implement its decisions. 
Competition authorities take the form of most government authorities (i.e., 
a specialized administrative agency vested with powers to investigate, 
prosecute and decide cases brought before it). In Latin America, most 
 
 
 3. An introductory review on public choice can be found in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE (1979). See also James M. Buchanan, Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public 
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications,” in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II (James M. 
Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., University of Michigan Press 1984). 
 4. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, supra note 1; see also Richard A. Posner, The New 
Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 
(1993). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-16 (1977). 
 6. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
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competition authorities take this form, either as a body corporate 
commission (e.g., Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico), or as a single-
authority superintendency (e.g., in Colombia and Venezuela). Because of 
this organization these authorities are subject to judicial control, or 
occasionally, to political control in specific matters (e.g., merger and 
acquisitions in Spain). Alternatively, competition authorities may take the 
form of independent public prosecutors whose role is to investigate 
markets and bring cases before the specialized judicial entities. 
As always, there are advantages and disadvantages to adopting either 
scheme. Administrative entities may enjoy more flexibility in enforcement 
actions, because they handle the entire antitrust case, from investigation to 
final disposition. However, consolidating these activities under a single 
authority may inject rule-of-law problems, because of the personal 
involvement of the prosecuting authorities in the investigation. Due to the 
potential lack of protection for individual’s rights where one body 
determines the outcome at all stages there may be problems, especially in 
a country that lacks experience implementing that particular policy. It may 
be very difficult for the same people who carry out an investigation and 
bring a case against a business, not to find the investigated party guilty as 
charged. This could create considerable uncertainty in the business 
community and have negative effects on further investment. 
Another feature of administrative entities is their close relationship 
with the government in general, which has advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage is the likelihood of effective involvement in regulatory 
reform initiatives. Regulatory reform is probably the single most important 
contribution that a competition authority can make to the transition 
process. However, competition authorities can also interfere with the 
government’s objectives, because their proposals contradict many of the 
government’s anticompetitive policies. To ensure a fruitful relationship, 
safeguards must be established to preserve the independence of the 
competition authorities, in financial and functional terms, as well as in its 
recommendations on regulatory reform. The most recent Latin American 
competition laws, vest competition authorities with powers to judicially 
challenge anticompetitive regulations enacted by governments.7 However, 
these powers are rarely exercised in deference to a cooperative rather than 
confrontational approach.  
 
 
 7. The most notable example is the Costa Rican Law to Promote Competition and Defense of 
the Consumer, Promoción de Competencia y Defensa del Consumidor, D.O., 4 de Septiembre de 1995. 
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Judicial entities have limitations as well. In general, courts are 
unfamiliar with the economic substratum underlying market functions; 
their decisions frequently rely on formalities and “black letter” law rather 
than a substantial examination of the issues. Yet, in a democracy, courts 
have obvious advantages over government entities in terms of sufficient 
investigative powers, as well as injunctive authority, which may be 
necessary to preempt anticompetitive behavior. Finally, judicial authorities 
are more independent from the government than administrative 
commissions, which is crucial for the success of competition policy. 
After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of administrative 
versus judicial competition authorities, some Latin American countries 
have opted for hybrid structures for their competition agencies rather than 
strictly adhering to administrative or judicial models. In Peru, for example, 
the competition authority is an administrative commission that 
investigates, prosecutes, and decides cases. However, a specialized 
administrative tribunal on competition enforcement reviews its decisions, 
thereby providing external controls. An important feature of this scheme is 
that the competition tribunal is also vested with powers to review matters 
that are closely related to market supervision, such as intellectual property 
issues, anti-dumping and subsidies claims, consumer protection issues, and 
unfair competition matters. In this way, the Peruvian scheme ensures that 
the tribunal covers a broad (yet, closely related) range of subjects, so that 
its portion of the national budget is justifiable. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of the policy depends on ensuring that 
enforcement procedures integrate the three prosecutorial stages, thereby 
balancing effectiveness with preservation of impartiality in decision-
making. In ensuring both ends, it is fundamental that the authority have 
the necessary powers, while also guaranteeing the professionalism of the 
officials handling the cases and the impartiality of those deciding them.  
II. THE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY ON THE CHOICE OF POLICY DECISIONS 
Institutional analysis is useful to explore the extent to which policy 
decisions are influenced by the decision-makers’ beliefs, values, and 
perceptions about the real world that they must appraise and judge.  
It may seem counterintuitive to argue that decision-making is 
ultimately based on ideology, not science. However, policy decisions are, 
overall, basically moral decisions about social welfare. Hence, they 
comprise value judgments on how to achieve well-being. Contrary to 
popular belief, policymakers are not immune to the influence of ideology; 
on the contrary, they embrace it as part of their ordinary policy-making 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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activities. This fact is often dismissed. There seems to be a prejudice 
against the idea that policy choice ultimately rests on ethics, not science. 
There is likely an underlying fear of being regarded as less “objective” or 
“impartial” in the decision-making process. The tension in policy-making 
is evident. On one hand, policymakers strive to preserve their image as 
impartial actors, which is essential for convincing the business community 
of the transparency of their decisions. On the other hand, their activities 
require them to achieve a state of social welfare, which could result in 
eroding the property rights of some individuals at the expense of others. 
Therefore, the implementation of such a system could overturn their 
endeavors to preserve the rule of law. 
It is clear then that science is not a value-free undertaking, especially in 
the realm of normative economics, from which competition policy draws 
many of its inferences and conclusions about economic causation and 
market behavior. Competition policy entails value choices about social 
resource allocation. There are some who believe that such allocation 
should be based on economic efficiency, and others who believe that other 
socially valuable goals, such as market integration or the protection of 
smaller competitors, should bear some weight in the allocation. The 
former view is commonly associated with policy-making in the United 
States, whereas the latter is associated with policy enforcement in the 
European Union.  
In support of their view, Americans claim that economic efficiency is 
much more transparent and predictable than other social welfare goals. In 
addition, they claim that it is not the goal of competition policy to seek 
social justice; indeed, other policies such as taxation and subsidies 
specifically target this concern much more effectively. The Europeans 
contend that other values are equally important. Nevertheless, over the 
years, European policy enforcement has yielded to the efficiency standard. 
Thus, there seems to be a growing consensus towards accepting economic 
efficiency as the guiding goal of competition enforcement endeavors. 
To be sure, in order to remain “transparent,” competition policy should 
avoid becoming involved in ideas of “distributive justice.” However, it is 
unclear whether economic efficiency (much less “distributive” criteria, 
such as equity) provides policymakers with a clearer standard to follow or 
makes decision-making more predictable or transparent. In fact, a closer 
look reveals that the strict enforcement of the Pareto efficiency standard 
would undermine the rule of law, and could become a potential hinderance 
to achieving market competition. 
To understand this concept, it may be useful to examine the essence of 
the efficiency standard, and its working on the mental framework from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/12
p405 De Leon book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 411 
 
 
 
 
which the policymaker derives specific normative conclusions about 
business behavior. Such normative conclusions are based on a contrived 
market view that is epistemologically flawed. 
The next part explains why implementing social welfare goals like 
economic efficiency might undermine rather than promote competition in 
the marketplace. 
A. The Nirvana Mindset and Social Policymaking 
The lure of economic efficiency is rooted in the policymaker’s quest to 
achieve a utopian standard of social welfare through targeted intervention. 
This idea stems from the assumption that policymakers can attain a 
complete picture of the underlying factors that comprise social reality, and 
regulate it to attain social welfare. However, to achieve this, policymakers 
must meet two conditions. First, they must possess the adequate analytical 
tools to understand and appraise reality properly. Usually, they refer to 
market “models,” which enable them to capture the essence of market 
forces. Therefore, an in-depth exploration of the nature, meaning, and 
epistemological flaws of these models is necessary to understand why 
policymakers’ picture of reality is often dimmed. 
A second condition for attaining social welfare is to identify what 
exactly optimality entails in terms of the costs that the social system (i.e. 
governments and entrepreneurs) must bear to reach this ideal point. 
Indeed, it is pointless to attain social welfare if the costs of achieving it 
largely exceed those benefits accruing from reacing Nirvana. Nevertheless, 
policy-makers often take for granted the costless nature of such an 
exercise. This phenomena flows from the belief that the goal of social 
policymaking is to recreate a world without costs. 
These two premises are deeply ingrained in the minds of policymakers. 
They stem from the Cartesian assumption that reality is an objective self, 
located outside the individual mind, which we can fully appraise and 
understand.8 There converts social policymaking into a “pretense of 
knowledge” where “optimality,” “social welfare,” and other synonymous 
expressions of “social perfection” appear accessible and become a moral 
imperative on the shoulders of policymakers. 
This Nirvana mindset equates to the attainment of “perfect justice.” As 
a goal of policymaking, perfect justice requires rooting out error in every 
 
 
 8. See generally F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1 (University of 
Chicago Press 1973). 
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case, regardless of the costs involved.9 Similarly, Thomas Sowell refers to 
“cosmic justice” or justice that is cost-free and takes into account the 
particular welfare position of each individual in society so as to level its 
condition to that of the rest.10 Sowell criticizes this endeavor on the 
grounds that it is impossible to devise an ideal standard of equality that 
would satisfy the individual condition of everyone alike given the costs 
involved in such efforts. Thus, “with justice, as with equality, the question 
is not whether more is better, but whether it is better at all costs.”11 
In Sowell’s view,  
those pursuing the quest for cosmic justice have tended to assume 
that the consequences would be what they intended—which is to 
say, that the people subject to government policies would be like 
pieces on a chessboard, who could be moved here and there to carry 
out a grand design, without concern for their own responses.12  
Similar concerns arise in economic science and competition 
policymaking. Those who support economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare base their views on the Pareto efficiency standard. The normative 
reference stems from the assumption that markets resembling the perfect 
competition model are “optimal” and enhance social welfare. Substitute 
standards, such as “Workable Competition,” follow the same logic, 
namely, that somewhere in our minds we can devise models enabling us to 
see how things would be different if we lived in a world without market 
failures.  
Conventional wisdom of competition policy tells us that market failure 
is responsible for the sub-optimal allocation of resources. Monopolistic 
behavior causes such failures in markets by creating special conditions 
within which information asymmetries are exploited to the advantage of 
alleged monopolists. As a result, market performance is driven away from 
the optimal conditions laid down by the perfect competition model, in 
which production is undifferentiated, information flows freely, and firms 
are price takers, rather than price manipulators. 
Therefore, the crux of this view is the comparison between the mental 
or idealized model of perfection and the reality that we perceive through 
our senses. This is a faulty intellectual exercise because comparing reality 
 
 
 9. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 38 (Harvard University Press 
1995). 
 10. THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE 27 (1999). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 40. 
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with such ideal standards excludes from analysis two kinds of costs that 
are also part of reality and must be taken into account by regulations. The 
first is the cost of acquiring that information, which optimal regulation 
requires. This intellectual error considers the possibility of perfection, but 
ignores how hard it is for the authority to obtain the necessary information 
to make this a reality. Thus, compared to Nirvana, reality always appears 
full of “market failures.” 
Second, comparing reality with Nirvana neglects the costs that 
members of society have to bear to invest in productive actions. These 
actions would never take place (and therefore, could not be considered part 
of the regulatory analysis) in isolation, but only occur once investors have 
internalized their costs. This fact is a reality that regulators simply cannot 
afford to ignore.  
Consider the following example. Imagine that we visit a children’s 
swim club and ask the kids if they are willing to make the sacrifices 
necessary to become Olympic champion swimmers. We would probably 
get many positive responses despite the fact that perhaps only one in ten 
thousand young swimmers is really willing to pay the costs of becoming 
an Olympian. Efficiency analysis implies that we would be better off if we 
just asked the swimmers what they would sacrifice to make the Olympics, 
and then appointed those who bid the highest to the Olympic team. In the 
opinion of those who promote this way of thinking, this intellectual 
exercise would certainly save all the time it takes to do costly training. 
Thus, reality “fails” because many individual swimmers do spend time 
training even though most of them fail to make it to the Olympics. 
In the world of business, such comparisons between ideal standards of 
perfection and the actual business world leaves the regulator with the 
pervasive impression that any business behavior is suspicious of restricting 
competition, because entrepreneurs enter into costs and limit their own 
possibilities of action to achieve a degree of certainty with which to pursue 
productive investments. From the viewpoint of efficiency, these 
limitations on rivalry represent a departure from the perfection 
competition model. It is not examined whether the limitations imposed are 
in fact necessary for entrepreneurs to seize a business opportunity, which, 
in order to happen, must necessarily displace other competitors in the 
market. The nature of competition entails the success of some alert 
entrepreneur in “getting there first,” before other competitors do, but this 
does not necessarily mean that our entrepreneur has ”gotten there” at the 
expense of another.  
Applying the perfect competition model as a normative standard is at 
odds with the alleged purpose it should serve. Instead of promoting 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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entrepreneurial alertness to improve competition, it informs regulators that 
competition is less likely the further the examined market is from the 
idealized “perfection” of perfect competition. 
In criticizing the use of the perfect competition model (or similar 
surrogates, such as the workable competition model) as a normative 
standard, Professor George Richardson, emphasized that such a model is 
meaningless as a normative reference, because the economist cannot 
simply do away with the economic organization that is necessary for 
economic actors to compete in the marketplace.13 He highlights the 
inadequacy of the perfect competition model in appraising reality, because 
the viewpoint it adopts is one of equilibrium, whereas reality is in a 
permanent process of change and evolution. 
Richardson’s critique is subtler than it appears on the surface. The very 
assumptions that would otherwise make the perfect competition model 
useful for policymaking purposes are in error—namely that information in 
the system as modeled is shared with all economic agents, thereby making 
equilibrium possible and bringing about perfectly competitive markets. 
Not only are these conditions absent in the real world, but more 
importantly, the model itself denies them. There is no other way of 
explaining how real social systems achieve equilibrium except by 
postulating that the information of the system is already known by 
economic agents before it has in fact passed to them. 
Richardson says this because at equilibrium the model assumes that 
information has already passed to individuals who then will rest in their 
actions. Yet, in order for this to happen, individuals must coordinate their 
actions, construe routines, and create rules, which enables information to 
be codified and universally understood. Thus, coordination, rule creation, 
and standardization of market behavior drive the market away from the 
world predicated on the perfect competition model, where individuals act 
independently. It is a paradox that, in order to attain equilibrium, 
individuals must coordinate their actions, but the coordination leads real 
markets away from the world of perfect competition, where industrial 
organization is virtually non-existent. Thus, in the words of Richardson:  
there is no reason to expect that the hypothetical market conditions 
which define perfect competition would in fact ensure that 
production would be carried on by the most efficient means, for 
there is no reason to believe that the supposed equilibrium position 
 
 
 13. See generally G. D. RICHARDSON, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT, A STUDY IN THE 
WORKING OF THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (2d ed. 1990). 
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would ever be reached. The link between market structure and the 
scale of investments is to be sought more in the particular modes of 
adjustment, than in the supposed equilibrium situations, with which 
the structure can be associated. Here, as elsewhere, much that is of 
importance has been denied adequate analysis as a result of the 
tyranny which the equilibrium concept has exercised over modern 
economic theory.14 
Economic organization, business arrangements, coordination and 
cooperation among businesses are essential for information to flow 
between economic agents. But at the same time, such arrangements cause 
reality to depart from the equilibrium. This is a critique that is equally 
applicable to models of “imperfect competition” that appraise reality from 
an equilibrium perspective. These models assume that the information 
necessary to attain the optimal point is readily available to the individuals 
in the model’s equation. Therefore, it also undermines the efficacy of the 
workable competition model and the pure monopoly model as normative 
standards to be enforced upon reality. 
However, the perfect competition model:  
undoubtedly stood, for many people, as an ideal or model form of 
organization—strictly speaking only a logical as opposed to an 
ethical ideal, although this distinction was not always sharply made. 
It does not seem to have been recognized that the fact that 
‘imperfections’, in some forms and degree of strength, are clearly 
an obstacle to adjustment, does not entitle one to conclude that it 
would be best if [market] ‘imperfections’ were absent altogether. 
Yet the pedagogic convenience of perfect competition, and its 
suitability as a base for extensive formal and mathematical 
elaboration, gave the system a central place in theoretical 
discussion.15 
 
 
 14. Id. at 89. 
 15. Id. at 39. Klein explains the importance of the Perfect Competition model for antitrust 
purposes as follows: “of all the various analytical toolkits that constitute contemporary political 
economy, perhaps the most important model for the economist is the model of perfect competition.” B. 
Klein, The Use of Economics in Anti-trust Litigation: Realistic Models of the Competitive Process in 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY 420, (F. Mathewson et al. eds., 1990). J.M. Clark 
argues:  
The conception of ‘perfect competition’ has itself for the first time received really specific 
definition and elaboration. With this has come the realisation that ‘perfect competition’ does 
not and cannot exist and has presumably never existed [ . . . ] What we have left is an unreal 
or ideal standard which may serve as a starting point of analysis and a norm with which to 
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In sum, evaluating market functioning based on the standard of ideal 
perfection required by the perfect competition model is not only naïve (in 
assuming that the information necessary to attain perfection will be readily 
possessed by the government authority), but also misleading, because it 
tells the regulator very little about the true nature of the behavior in the 
market. The truth is that we do not live in a world of perfection, but one in 
which individuals must bear costs to achieve goals. Assuming that reality 
would be different if we were angels instead of human beings does not 
contribute much to the task that the competition authority is charged 
with—namely, promoting market exchanges. Comparing reality with 
perfection only leads one to misjudge the important role played by 
economic organizations in conveying knowledge to market participants by 
making such organizations look like negative forces that manipulate 
markets away from perfect competition. 
Schumpeter warned us about this normative spin in the regulator’s 
mind when he said:  
 the problem that is usually being visualized [by regulators] is how 
capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant 
problem is how it creates and destroys them. As long as this is not 
recognized, the investigator does a meaningless job. As soon as it is 
recognized, his outlook on capitalist practice and its social results 
changes considerably.16 
Put simply, the Nirvana mindset is epistemologically flawed, because it 
induces the analyst to focus her attention on irrelevant equilibrium 
problems of resource allocation, which are futile for understanding how 
markets actually evolve endogenously. 
 
 
compare actual competitive conditions. It has also served as a standard by which to judge 
them. 
(emphasis added). 
J. M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AMER. ECON. REV. 241 (1940). Finally, 
Hayek indicated with regard to the perfect competition model that: “This ideal case came to be 
regarded as the model and was used as a standard by which the achievement of competition in the real 
world was judged”. F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A 
FREE PEOPLE, VOL 3 (1976). Burton recently wrote an analysis on the use of perfect competition as a 
normative yardstick. John Burton, Competition over competition analysis: a guide to some 
contemporary economics disputes, in FRONTIERS OF COMPETITION LAW (Julian Lonbay ed., 1994). 
 16. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d 1950). 
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B. Practical Consequences of the Nirvana Mindset of Competition Policy 
Regulators 
This Part outlines some implications of the conventional ideology 
embodied in the model of perfect competition on competition policy 
enforcement. 
First, from the perspective of law enforcement, comparing frail human 
beings to the optimal standard of perfection leads policymakers to develop 
ambiguous and hesitant enforcement procedures, thereby sacrificing the 
rule of law and market transparency. Any level of cooperation between 
actors will be regarded with suspicion unless justified with economic 
efficiency, but such efficiency exists only in the mind of whoever enforces 
the policy. Therefore, no one else (e.g., a prosecuted businesses) can 
predict whether a particular arrangement will match the standard of 
efficiency devised in the regulator’s mind. 
The distinction between “per se” and “rule-of-reason” behavior will not 
help in distinguishing right from wrong. This is a legal, non-economic 
distinction that merely purports to spare the competition agency the costs 
of examining cases, which, from the viewpoint of competition authorities, 
appear “obvious.” It can be easily seen as simply another way of saying 
that “per se” prohibited behavior will always be prohibited because it is 
already regarded as conduct that cannot ever be allowed. In other words, it 
is a tautology, explaining under what factual circumstances the authority 
should tolerate or allow restrictive behavior on the basis of efficiency. 
The truth is that given that the standard of economic efficiency is 
ultimately found in the ethical preference of the regulator, her judgment 
cannot be subject to any rule of precedent. What she finds efficient today 
may be found inefficient tomorrow. Predictably, her inability to make 
meaningful judgments on the basis of efficiency induces her to look at 
other factors to indicate what is right and wrong. Her natural tendency will 
be to lean on her own perception of which industrial, highly concentrated 
market should raise concerns to competition authorities.  
In this connection, George Stigler observes:  
[d]efinitions do not yield any knowledge about the real world, but 
they do influence impressions of the world. If only markets with a 
vast number of traders are perfectly competitive, and if markets 
with few traders are called oligopolistic (literally, “few sellers”), 
that suggests that these latter markets are not competitive, as well as 
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not perfectly competitive. [Consequently] the suspicion of small 
numbers was gradually reinforced by the antitrust cases.17 
It is not surprising that the perception of illegality has changed so 
dramatically in American jurisprudence and European competition policy 
enforcement, if one compares contemporary trends with those prevailing at 
the time the policy was developed. Conduct that was previously “per se” 
illegal is examined under the rule-of-reason today; conduct that was 
prosecuted in the past is tolerated today. Consider the evolution of 
policymaking in the fields of resale price maintenance, monopolization, 
and mergers and acquisitions. In all of these areas the change in the 
jurisprudence has been notorious.  
Of course, antitrust enforcement has not been entirely chaotic. It has 
essentially remained stable. From the institutional perspective, it can be 
argued that competition law enforcement has been stable over time due to 
the positive effect of other institutional factors distinct from the personal 
beliefs of the enforcer—notably, the organizational structure of the 
authority through legal rules that delay or impede a given course of action 
considered socially good by the policymaker. 
In particular, the stability of the rule of law surrounding the 
organizational structure of competition policy enforcement in developed 
countries has prevented competition enforcement from falling out of 
bounds. By contrast, such institutional stability cannot be taken for granted 
in many transitional and developing economies. It is for this reason that it 
is important to consider this second factor as well. 
The very transition from a planned to market economy introduces a 
great deal of uncertainty among economic agents, which is absent from the 
jurisdictions of developed countries. This is a consideration that is often 
overlooked, especially by those recommending the adoption of traditional 
competition policy enforcement in developing countries. It illustrates the 
importance of tying competition enforcement analysis to the institutional 
framework within which it is inserted. This uncertainty in policy 
enforcement contributes to the uncertain business environment that 
prevails in developing countries, which could be quite chilling on 
investments and economic development. 
A second consequence of focusing policy attention on achieving social 
welfare goals such as efficient resource allocation, is that such an exercise 
neglects the role of resource creation through innovation. Clearly, this 
focus ignores another essential goal of developing countries, namely, 
 
 
 17. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 94 (1988).  
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promoting innovation, resourcefulness, entrepreneurship, and 
competitiveness. 
This insensitivity stems from the static or equilibrium view of 
competition introduced by the model, which by definition neglects the role 
of innovation and creative entrepreneurship in driving efficiency—what 
economists refer to as the production frontier. Conventional models have 
attempted to address this limitation by introducing some dynamics into 
model building. Unfortunately, these models are still unable to grasp both 
the evolutionary nature of market systems and the role of innovation in 
introducing new information into the market. Even under this analysis, 
antitrust policy still upholds its structural bias inherited from the old days 
of the Sherman Act, when industrial firms dominated the landscape of the 
economy. Today, however, in light of rapid innovation in high-tech 
industries, such definitions appear somewhat constraining to the 
policymaker. Consider the elements necessary to determine a firm’s 
dominance or possession of market power under competition analysis. 
Under such analysis, product substitution is strictly limited to competing 
products that already exist in the market. However, the pace of innovation 
in some industries is such that new competing products may emerge into 
the market before the completion of legal proceedings. 
It is not surprising that all comparisons to the equilibrium state of 
perfect competition are doomed to fail in explaining a constantly evolving 
reality. The intellectual error of believing in such a comparison lies in the 
fact that markets cannot be compared to equilibrium positions such as the 
perfect competition model (or, at the other extreme, the pure monopoly 
model), simply because markets are, to put in Schumpeterian terms, under 
a constant process of creative destruction of evolutionary change. “The 
essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing 
with an evolutionary process.”18  
A third implication of the epistemological spin of the conventional 
approach on market competition as a “perfect” (or “imperfect”) market 
rather than an ongoing process of entrepreneurial discovery is that it forces 
 
 
 18. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 82- 83. More specifically he states:  
Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but 
never can be stationary. And this evolutionary character of the capitalist process is not merely 
due to the fact that economic life goes on in a social and natural environment which changes 
and by its change alters the data of economic action. [ . . . ] The fundamental impulse that sets 
and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods, the new 
methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial 
organization that capitalist enterprises creates. 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p405 De Leon book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:405 
 
 
 
 
the analyst to focus attention on the assumed welfare implications arising 
out of the particular conditions prevailing in the marketplace at that time 
in which the analysis is made. All of the concern about the role of 
institutions is virtually excluded from the analysis. The focus of regulators 
is on allocating resources using equilibrium models, which, again, take for 
granted the role of those institutions that make market exchanges possible 
at all. Therefore, attention is not focused on the institutional conditions 
that make markets, but on comparing isolated points of such movement 
against the optimal standard of the perfect competition model. No 
attention is placed on the institutional conditions enabling or frustrating 
the ongoing market process in carrying out its “destructively creative” 
advancement towards innovation and economic progress. Economic 
analysis stops short of comparing optimal states of equilibrium with those 
of “real” markets. 
In other words, no meaningful research is aimed at answering the 
vexing institutional questions that are important for development, such as: 
what are the springs of economic development and how do entrepreneurs 
strive to out do their rivals? 
In conclusion, the ideology element of competition policy is 
responsible for the development of alternative views of policy 
enforcement, by either emphasizing the pursuit of efficient market 
outcomes or strengthening the institutions that enable the market process 
to become viable.  
III. THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION 
POLICY MAKING 
In order to give a complete picture of the institutional determinants of 
competition policy, it is important to highlight the role played by the 
cultural setting in which competition policy is to be enforced. Culture 
plays a fundamental role in the policymaking design that ought to 
complement, not distort, competition policy enforcement. For this reason, 
it is important to examine the institutional development of the society to 
determine the extent to which potential restrictions on competition may 
accrue in the form of policies, which are actively promoted by 
governments. This reveals it is for transitioning and developing countries 
to deal with such governmental restrictions.  
This realm includes the social perception of whether competition and 
free markets are social goods. It exposes the contradictions frequently 
found in transitioning and developing countries as a result of their 
economic history and past policies. Additionally, it reveals how historic 
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institutions influence social perception of free markets and fundamental 
institutions enabling competition, such as individual property rights. 
In Latin America the development of colonial institutions played a 
fundamental role in stifling the emergence of property rights. These 
colonial institutions resulted in a high concentration of wealth and heavy 
involvement of the Spanish Crown in economic affairs. Institutions such 
as the “Encomienda,” whereby the Crown empowered the Spanish 
conquerors to oversee the Indians at their charge, never evolved into 
feudal institutions as in Northern Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. 
The conquerors never acquired a similar status as that of the feudal barons, 
who had judicial powers and became a rival force to that of kings. 
Municipalities in the Spanish colonies, were closely overseen by royal 
representatives and never evolved into real parliaments. Commerce was 
stifled at the expense of the military society, which the Spanish colonies 
inherited from the Castilian military society that evolved from the Spanish 
wars against the Moors in the Middle Ages. 
After independence was gained in the nineteenth century, the pattern of 
institutions remained virtually unscathed. During the twentieth century, 
economic centralism became even more pronounced. This development 
was a sub-product of the prevailing State interventionism, which 
eventually became the core of public policy until the 1980s. As a result of 
economic centralization public policy tended to eliminate competition, 
which was regarded as a dangerous threat to planning development. 
Economic planning was considered the fundamental means of allocating 
resources. Most industries were either nationalized or had their prices 
heavily controlled by the State. Licensing was made compulsory in many 
economic sectors, which impeded competition. These policies particularly 
affected small and medium-sized firms from abroad. Tariff and non-tariff 
barriers heavily restrained foreign trade to the detriment of domestic 
competition, which remained isolated from foreign competition. Most 
Latin American countries did not enter the General Agreement on Trade & 
Tariffs (GATT) until the 1980s or afterwards. Domestic industries were 
closely regulated by the state. Cartels and other forms of competitive 
restrictions were not only tolerated but also openly promoted by the State. 
These features of industrial policy are clearly replicated in many 
developing countries, such as China. Although China’s economic 
institution history is quite different from that of Latin America, the 
replication of ideological similarities is remarkable. In both cases, the 
exercise of close government interventionism on economic affairs was the 
by-product of adhering to the idea that central planning represents the best 
tool of promoting economic development. Professor Ding Lu of the 
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National University of Singapore lists a number of structural legacies 
inherited from the centrally planned economy in China.19 This list is 
almost identical to that of any Latin American country prior to economic 
liberalization. 
First, the high concentration of resource allocation in certain key 
industries was a legacy of China’s central planning. China’s economy 
grew as a result of the highly centralized resource allocation in strategic 
industries, particularly heavy industries and infrastructure. However, such 
concentration did not reach the levels of some Latin American countries, 
where nationwide industrial monopolies were created. Instead, 
specialization took place in China at the provincial and local level. 
Second, the development of a fragmentary domestic market was a 
legacy of China’s central planning. Due to the difficulties that central 
planning caused in coordinating information in the command economy, 
the production targets were not effectively disaggregated according to the 
planned hierarchy. As a result, high uncertainty levels ensued, which 
created recurrent problems of supply shortage. As a result, local managers 
tried to solve the supply problem by becoming self-sufficient. However, 
markets had become vertically integrated, resulting in insufficient 
specialization, excessive duplication, and a low level of standardization of 
machinery and component parts.  
In Latin America, the effects on the industrial organization of many 
industries have been remarkably similar. This phenomenon is due to the 
uncertainty created by the distrust and judicial ineffectiveness in enforcing 
contracts. To avoid these problems, many familiar businesses have 
developed and effectively replaced the formal legal system. 
Third, the proliferation of cartel-type collusive conduct among 
businesses was prevalent. In Latin America, cartels were actively 
promoted in view of the interest of governments in ensuring the 
permanence of inefficient domestic producers in the market. Additionally, 
prices were controlled with the consumer often paying the price of 
inefficiency. Similarly, in China, notorious cartels existed as a means of 
ensuring planned targets and coping with supply shortages. 
Fourth, the development of large enterprises as mini welfare states was 
a legacy of the centrally planned economy. In China, centralized resource 
allocation, State ownership, and empire building have influenced the 
perception towards state-owned enterprises. Instead of regarding these 
 
 
 19. Ding Lu, Regulatory Framework against Unfair Competition for an Emerging Market 
Economy 39 SINGAPORE ECON. REV. 33, 33-58 (1994). 
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enterprises as firms that produce goods and services, they came to be 
viewed as welfare entities to distribute benefits to its members. Likewise, 
the difficulty in undertaking privatization in Latin America evidences a 
similar phenomenon.  
Finally, the lack of mechanism of free entry and exit and the absence of 
import competition were also a lasting impact of central planning. 
To overcome these problems, the Chinese government has pursued a 
policy of gradual, but steady economic liberalization. However, the 
stifling legacy of central planning is still reflected in heavy-handed 
government policies, which may actually complicate matters for 
competition. Professor Lu explores an alternative approach to use a more 
direct kind of government interference, which is aimed at directly shaping 
business arrangements.20  
There are several examples of an industrial policy sponsored by the 
government that would help achieve these goals. First, the promotion of 
anticompetitive behavior, such as horizontal economic cooperation 
(hengxiang jingji lianhe) between enterprises in different regions and 
under different industrial ministries would help to break down artificially 
imposed market segmentation. The means of cooperation can take various 
forms such as joint ventures, coordinating production, and contracts 
coordinating raw material provision and processing.  
Second, government supported enterprise groupings (qiye jituan), 
involving enterprises from different regions, industrial ministries, and 
ownership structures would facilitate the transition. These groupings may 
take the form of vertical integration of raw material supply, production, 
marketing and sales, or corporation in the production and sales of similar 
or correlated products. 
Third, the government should support mergers by large and medium-
sized State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) that promote interregional and 
interministerial mergers, as well as the joint operation between enterprises 
(lian ying). 
Instead of adopting these policies designed to directly shape business 
arrangements, China imposed other governmental policies that had an 
adverse impact on market competition.  
First the government implemented an unequal tax treatment of different 
ownership, which changed only after the introduction of the 1994 tax 
 
 
 20. See generally id. Other sources referred by Lu comprise the State Commission on 
Restructuring the Economic System, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSI FAGUI HUIBIAN 
[COLLECTION OF CORPORATION LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (1991); ALMANAC OF 
CHINA’S ECONOMY (1987). 
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reform. But this reform still has not addressed the administrative 
protection of local interests, which created a special tax treatment in favor 
of firms located in local jurisdictions.  
Second, the lack of a unified company law up to the end of 1993 gave 
rise to numerous administrative companies. In these companies, 
applications enjoying official backing have an advantage in the process of 
establishment.  
Third, there existed a “dual pricing system,” which tended to favor 
administrative companies. Although these distortions have been 
significantly reduced, they still affect much of the business landscape, in 
addition to the market expectations of economic agents. 
In sum, it is important to highlight the role played by the cultural 
setting of the society in which the competition policy is to be enforced. 
Culture plays a fundamental role in policymaking that should 
complementcompetition policy enforcement. For this reason, one must 
explore institutional development of the society to evaluate any potential 
restrictions on competition that may exist in the form of government 
policies. Institutional development reveals is the importance for countries 
emerging from the road of central planning to address competition policy 
to deal with such government restrictions.  
IV. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 
MAKING FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
Conventional competition policymaking, and design competition 
policy must be challenged to overcome the anti-competitive culture. 
Evolutionary thinking of markets provides an alternative conceptual 
framework for the design of competition policy.  
This alternative view emerges from the simple awareness that if the 
world is in permanent disequilibrium, it is futile for policymakers to be 
concerned about attaining equilibrium. In other words, analysis of a 
permanently changing reality should rest on models capable of capturing 
the evolutionary essence of disequilibrium, in order to infer normative 
conclusions from it.  
Schumpeter clearly saw the risk of deducing normative conclusions 
from a misguided perception of the real world. Due to the relevance of his 
insight, his comments are worth quoting in full: 
First, since we are dealing with a process whose every element 
takes considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate 
effects, there is no point in appraising the performance of that 
process ex visu of a given point of time; we must judge its 
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performance over time, as it unfolds through decades or centuries. 
. . . Second, since we are dealing with an organic process, analysis 
of what happens in any particular part of it—say, in an individual 
concern or industry—may indeed clarify details of mechanism but 
is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy 
acquires its true significance only against the background of that 
process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its 
role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be 
understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there 
is a perennial lull.21 
For this reason, as he suggests: 
[Antitrust] economists who, ex visu of a point of time, look for 
example in the behavior of an oligopolist industry . . . and observe 
the well-known moves and countermoves within it that seem to aim 
at nothing but high prices and restrictions of output are making 
precisely that hypothesis. They accept the data of the momentary 
situation as if there were no past or future to it and think that they 
have understood what there is to understand if they interpret the 
behavior of those firms by means of the principle of maximizing 
profits with reference to those data. The usual theorist’s paper and 
the usual government commission’s report practically never try to 
see that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a piece of past 
history and, on the other hand, as an attempt to deal with a situation 
that is sure to change presently—as an attempt by those firms to 
keep on their feet, on ground that is slipping away from under them. 
In other words, the problem that is usually being visualized is how 
capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant 
problem is how it creates and destroys them. As long as this is not 
recognized, the investigator does a meaningless job. As soon as it is 
recognized, his outlook on capitalist practice and its social results 
changes considerably.22 (emphasis added) 
He concludes:  
In analyzing such [restrictive] business strategy ex visu of a given 
point of time, the investigating economist or government agent sees 
price policies that seem to him predatory and restrictions of output 
 
 
 21. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 83-84. 
 22. Id. at 84. 
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that seem to him synonymous with loss of opportunities to produce. 
He does not see that restrictions of this type are, in the conditions of 
the perennial gale, incidents, often unavoidable incidents, of a long 
run process of expansion which they protect rather than impede. 
There is no more of paradox in this than there is in saying that 
motorcars are travelling faster than they otherwise would because 
they are provided with brakes.23 
Clearly, Schumpeter advocates an alternative appraisal reality, capable 
of illuminating policymaking activities in a different light than that of 
conventional equilibrium economic analysis. 
This is all the more important to developing economies that are 
undergoing institutional change. During transition, the most pressing 
problem for these countries is the lack of the rule of law. This deficiency 
undermines the expectations of economic actors, thereby raising 
transaction costs. Competition policy should address these concerns 
upfront. Therefore, a proper policy agenda should avoid creating further 
distorting factors that could undermine the rule of law. It is very difficult 
to achieve this through enforcement based on Pareto efficiency, or indeed, 
other social welfare goals, as they ultimately reflect the preferences of 
those in charge of the policy, which could easily differ and cause the 
erosion of market expectations. 
Several mechanisms exist for competition authorities to reinforce the 
rule-of-law in market exchanges. The development of a clear agenda 
aimed at addressing both government and business created anticompetitive 
restrictions is an essential starting point. Concerning government 
restrictions, it is advisable to give the competition agency sufficient 
powers to undertake active regulatory reform. Such an initiative would 
facilitate the dismantling of government rules through deregulation, in 
support of privatization and trade liberalization. 
Some guidelines could help in this task. First it is important to simplify 
administrative rules to create a “level playing field. However, clear 
principles should not sacrifice the flexibility needed to adapt to market 
change. Second, the agency should rely on white papers and other means 
of identifying voluntary business standards for each industry. These 
instruments could enable the authorities to devise general principles of fair 
conduct, a necessary element to promote regulatory reform. Third, private 
parties should be allowed to settle their disputes, thereby facilitating an 
efficient means of rights’ allocation. Fourth competition authorities and 
 
 
 23. Id. at 88. 
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sectorial regulators should cooperate with each other. Fifth, network 
industries should have fair access to the network. “Fairness” should be 
defined in accordance with the conventions, customs and traditions of the 
industry concerned. If principles cannot be identified and extracted from 
the industry itself, it may be useful to examine similar industries 
elsewhere. 
Competition authorities should also develop policy priorities for 
business conduct as follows: First, authorities should be very conscious of 
cartels created by government fiat, through regulations or legislation in the 
area of horizontal restraints. Second vertical restraints should be tolerated 
unless the claimant, proving the anti-competitive effect, provides specific 
evidence tradeoff trade impediment. In principle, long-term contracts are 
indicative of such intentions, provided they are exercised in areas where 
import competition cannot counteract these restrictive effects. Third, 
unilateral dominant behavior should be examined in cases where network 
access to smaller firms is constrained, especially where evidence shows a 
connection between the dominant firm denying access and the victim’s 
downstream or upstream competitor. Fourth, mergers and acquisitions 
should generally be tolerated, especially if import competition remains 
open. the services industry, foreign competition should be ensured through 
the elimination of licensing and special permits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Exploring the role of culture in competition policy development 
immediately raises important issues of law and economics, which are far 
from settled. Given its broader perspective, institutional analysis 
overcomes the constraints of logical positivism that inspires much of the 
conventional economic and legal theory. Such reliance has driven policy 
makers away from a more complete understanding of the issues that 
explain the fundamental role played by institutions, thereby departing 
from a richer appraisal of social reality. 
Institutions embody collectively shared, individual values and beliefs. 
But where do these values come from? How do they acquire shape? And 
perhaps more importantly, what role do they play in policymaking design 
and implementation? These questions suggest that policymaking is far 
from a science, and in fact, is closer to art. Hence, it cannot exist without 
all the surrounding institutional circumstances conditioning business 
behavior.  
It is important, for this reason, to acknowledge several points. First, 
competition policy, like any human endeavor, is grounded in ideology and 
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normative values, not hard science. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, 
provided society is fully aware of the nature of the ethical debate 
entertained by competition policy authorities. In this way, the necessary 
institutional constraints will be instituted to prevent competition policy 
from becoming unbridled or uncontrolled. Indeed, such constraints are 
essential to reinforcing the rule of law, predictability of the policy, and 
transparency of market rules. Second, the fact that normative standards are 
ultimately ethical does not necessarily qualify the conclusion that anyone 
can genuinely draw from the mere understanding of market dynamics. For 
this reason, rather than judging entrepreneurial behavior from a normative 
standpoint, competition policy authorities should concentrate on making 
surrounding institutions more transparent and open to entrepreneurs, so as 
to draw tentative guidelines about the best possible way to promote market 
exchanges. By doing away with contrived social welfare imaginary 
constructions, and looking past business experience in closer inspection, 
the market exchanges have a greater opportunity to reach their utmost 
potential. Third, competition authorities should avoid falling into the 
intellectual trap of endorsing contrived social welfare standards that 
essentially contradict market competition. Developing and transitioning 
countries should be particularly careful to remember that the ultimate goal 
of competition must be connected to the development of competitiveness, 
innovation and economic development. Fourth, culture is a fundamental 
factor that policymakers must take into account at the time of a 
competition policy’s development. A central planning tradition 
perpetuates ways of conceiving policymaking that may run against the 
logic of introducing markets, thereby making the initial work of 
competition authorities particularly cumbersome. It is necessary to give 
them the right tools to devise alternative policy solutions to government 
interference on the markets. 
These fundamental reasons suggest that the competition authorities’ 
policy agenda should address regulatory reform and exercise strong 
“competition advocacy,” thereby challenging government regulations and 
rules that inhibit innovation and business development. Based on the 
experience of Latin America and other countries outside the region, this 
should become a central concern of policy making for competition 
authorities. It is essential that professional, independent, and highly 
motivated officials enforce competition policy. In addition, proper rules 
should be instituted to ensure that decisions are balanced, carefully 
drafted, quickly enforced, and above all, always controlled by a well-
trained judiciary.  
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